Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII by John CornwellMy rating: 0 of 5 stars
Coming away from the book, I get the distinct impression fears of suppression of Catholicism, anti-Communist sentiment, and latent anti-Semitism gave birth to Pacelli's Vatican diplomatic and legal career and eventual papacy that all gave overt to covert Nazi support while being mute or close to mute on the Holocaust, even when its actions were withing sight of Vatican City. Pacelli's role in canon law and cementing Catholic influence legislatively predated WW II:
... In a letter dated February 15, 1913,23 Arch-bishop Rafaele Scapinelli reported to Pacelli his recent encounters with Serbian diplomats. The nuncio had evidently not been briefed on the developments, but, guessing what was afoot, he took it upon himself to set out the advantages and disadvantages of such a treaty. On balance, he conceded, a concordat would open up new prospects for Catholic influence in the Balkans ("where Catholics are considered foreigners with no impact on the political and cultural life of the country"), but he concluded with a chillingly prophetic observation:
Austria, however, appears determined to deal harshly with Serbia, and it is widely believed that there could be a war with that country in the spring, further complicating matters in the extreme. Would it not be better to leave [the concordat negotiations] for now rather than take risks in an uncertain and perilous set of circumstances that can only end with military humiliation for Serbia; for Serbia is a focus of attraction for the ambitions of the South Balkan states all of which seems destined to threaten the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire?24
Throughout the following twelve months, the Secretariat of State files show Father Cardon busily running between Rome and Belgrade, while Pacelli continued to play cat-and-mouse with the Austrian diplo-mats and the papal nuncio in Vienna. From the distressed notes of the Austrians, it emerges that Pacelli was determined, whatever the pleadings of Vienna, to end the protectorate status in the interests of centrist pa-pal politics rather than the local benefit of Serbian Catholics. In the meantime, as a sop to the Austrians, he was promoting the idea of patronatus rights, "purely honorific rights as are compatible with canon law."...
The Reich Concordat furthered such aims and gave Hitler certain gains including a fig leaf of respectability through implicit acceptance by the See while rolling back the effect of organized Catholics in party politics.
The signing of the Reich Concordat marked the formal beginning of German Catholicism's acceptance of its obligations under the terms of the treaty which imposed a moral duty on Catholics to obey the Nazi rulers. Thus Catholic critics fell silent. A great Church, which might have formed the basis of an opposition, confined itself to the sacristy.
There were to be notable exceptions, as for example Cardinal Faulhaber's Advent sermons in defense of the Old Testament in the fall of the year, but these were individual (and, as it turned out, qualified) acts of defiance. There was to be nothing remotely resembling a concerted act of protest from within Germany, even over issues connected with the infringements of the terms of the treaty itself.
Complexity comes in considering the The Oster Conspiracy of 1938, also called the September Conspiracy, a proposed plan to overthrow Hitler and the Nazi regime if Germany went to war with Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland. It was led by Oberstleutnant Hans Oster, deputy head of the Abwehr, and high-ranking conservatives within the Wehrmacht who opposed the regime for behavior that was threatening to bring Germany into a war that they believed it was not ready to fight. They planned to overthrow Hitler and the Nazi regime through a storming of the Reich Chancellery by forces loyal to the plot to take control of the government, who would either arrest or assassinate Hitler, and restore the Monarchy under Prince Wilhelm of Prussia, the grandson of Wilhelm II. It seems rash that Pacelli (not yet Pope) would conspire at any level and suggests while he was pro- a lot of things that seem regrettable now, he was not truly pro-Hitler
Pope Pius XII and the German resistance was largely a relationship of information support and encouragement. The relationship between Pope Pius XII and wartime Croatia centers on the Vatican's complex, controversial role during World War II regarding the fascist UstaĊĦe regime that included atrocities.
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Pope Pius XII's 1942 Christmas Radio Address was a time when he was much more aware and an opportunity to speak out.
...The war, he said, was the result of a social order that "concealed a fatal weakness and an unbridled lust for profit and power." (Such a vagary could have been applied, of course, to both sides, Axis and Allies. The initiative the Holy Father had to of fer the world at this juncture plead for a vow to be made by of good will to bring society back to its immovable center of gravity in divine law, and for all men to dedicate themselves to the service of the human person and the service of a divinely ennobled human society. "Humanity owes this vow," he now said, "to those innumerable exiles whom the hurricane of war has torn away from their native soil and dispersed in a foreign land, who might make their own and the Prophet's lament: 'Our inheritance is turned to aliens, our houses to strangers.'"
Then came the famous statement intended, as he later claimed, to be understood as a clear denunciation of the Nazi extermination of the Jewish people: "Humanity owes this vow to those hundreds of thousands who, with-out any fault of their own, sometimes only by reason of their nationality or race, are marked down for death or gradual extinction."
Here was the fullest extent of his protest and denunciation, after a year of encouragement, pleading, argument, proof upon proof of what had been happening in Poland and all over Europe. It was to remain the fullest extent of his protest and denunciation for the rest of the war.
Critics (such as historians and Polish/Allied diplomats at the time) faulted the address for being overly abstract, failing to explicitly name Nazi Germany or the Jewish people, and remaining the high-water mark of his public protest. The full text of the speech can be read via Papal Encyclicals Online.
Such reluctance to speak out about the Holocaust when even a warning could have saved lives arose from a background of traditional moderate anti-Semitism.
And there is a darker issue yet: the question put by Guenter Lewy in his essay in Commentary (February 1964). Having surveyed the documents and the arguments, Lewy writes: "Finally, one is inclined to conclude that the Pope and his advisers-influenced by the long tradition of moderate anti-Semitism so widely accepted in Vatican circles-did not view the plight of the Jews with a real sense of urgency and moral out-rage." He adds, advisedly, "For this assertion no documentation is possible, but it is a conclusion difficult to avoid."
The quote from historian Guenter Lewy, published in his landmark 1964 Commentary essay and expanded into his influential book The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany addresses the psychological and ideological motivations behind the Vatican's public silence and diplomatic caution.
Lewy’s argument can be broken down into three core elements:
• The Influence of Traditional Anti-Semitism: Lewy suggests that a long-standing culture of "moderate" or theological anti-Semitism within church circles subconsciously or consciously minimized the perceived urgency of the crisis. This distinguished it from the racial, violent anti-Semitism of the Nazis, but still created a barrier to full empathy.
• Lack of Moral Outrage: The core accusation is not necessarily active malice, but a profound lack of urgency and moral outrage proportionate to the systematic annihilation of European Jewry.
• The Historian's Challenge: Lewy candidly acknowledges a major hurdle in Holocaust historiography: no definitive documentation can prove an internal motivation or a lack of feeling. Instead, he argues that this psychological conclusion is "difficult to avoid" based on the pattern of the Vatican's actions, omissions, and diplomatic focus at the time.
This perspective remains a foundational pillar for critics who argue that the Papacy failed its ultimate moral test during the war, contrasting sharply with apologists who contend that Pius XII used quiet diplomacy to save thousands of lives behind the scenes.
So, in summary? Well, Pius XII was the last of twelve popes that had chosen the name Pius throughout Catholic Church history. Some users on Reddit agree that it has been an unusually long time since a pope chose the name Pius. I feel that is because no one wants to be associated with a tarnished reputation.
There is another thread here in exploring how Pius subordinated opposition to the Nazis to his goal of increasing and centralizing the power of the papacy to help realize his vision of an authoritarian Church ruled by the Vatican bureaucracy under an infallible pope.
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